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Unlocked and Loaded: Government Censorship of
3D-Printed Firearms and a Proposal for More Reasonable
Regulation of 3D-Printed Goods
DANTON BRYANS*
INTRODUCTION
In August 2012, Defense Distributed launched the Wiki Weapon Project.1 The
stated mission of the group was to produce a working 3D-printed firearm and then
publically release the corresponding data files.2 The group sought to raise $20,000
on the crowdfunding website Indiegogo for the design and creation of the world’s
first 3D-printed firearm,3 or a “Wiki Weapon” as the group referred to it.4 Despite
several setbacks with funding5 and producing6 the firearm, Defense Distributed
announced the successful test firing of a working prototype—the Liberator pistol—
less than a year later.7 True to its word—and name—Defense Distributed released
the prototype’s data files for the Liberator shortly thereafter.8
Almost immediately after Defense Distributed’s release, the U.S. Department of State
contacted Defense Distributed and ordered that all technical data—namely, the
computer-aided design (CAD) files—related to the Liberator, along with many other
weapon and weapon accessory designs, be removed immediately from the Internet.9
Despite believing that it was legal to make the blueprints available to the public, Defense
Distributed immediately and “voluntarily” complied with the order while the Department

† Copyright © 2015 Danton Bryans.
* J.D. 2014, Indiana University Maurer School of Law; B.S. 2011, Michigan State
University. I am grateful to Professor Leaffer for guidance, my colleagues for help, and my
family for support.
1. Andy Greenberg, ‘Wiki Weapon Project’ Aims To Create a Gun Anyone Can 3D-Print
at Home, FORBES.COM (Aug. 23, 2012, 9:00 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/andygreenberg
/2012/08/23/wiki-weapon-project-aims-to-create-a-gun-anyone-can-3d-print-at-home/.
2. Id.
3. Id.; see also Jessica Roy, WikiWeapon Campaign to 3D-Print Your Own Gun
Suspended by Indiegogo, BETABEAT (Aug. 23, 2012, 1:21 PM), http://betabeat.com
/2012/08/indiegogo-suspends-campaign-to-build-blueprints-for-3d-printed-gun/ (discussing
suspension of crowdfunding account).
4. Id.; see also Roy, supra note 3.
5. See Roy, supra note 3.
6. See Robert Beckhusen, 3-D Printer Company Seizes Machine from Desktop Gunsmith,
WIRED.COM (Oct. 1, 2012, 2:06 PM), http://www.wired.com/2012/10/3d-gun-blocked/.
7. Andy Greenberg, Meet the ‘Liberator’: Test-Firing the World’s First Fully
3D-Printed Gun, FORBES.COM (May 5, 2013, 5:30 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites
/andygreenberg/2013/05/05/meet-the-liberator-test-firing-the-worlds-first-fully-3d-printed
-gun/print/.
8. See id.
9. Jessica Roy, At the Command of the State Department, Defense Distributed Pulls Its
3D Printed Gun Blueprints, BETABEAT (May 9, 2013, 4:29 PM), http://betabeat.com
/2013/05/defense-distributed-state-department-cody-wilson-3d-guns/.
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of State reviewed regulatory compliance of the files.10 However, Pandora’s Box was
already open, and the files were easily accessible on the Internet.11
This Comment analyzes the regulations in place on 3D-printed firearms and
proposes a new standard for regulating 3D-printed goods. Part I provides a brief
primer on 3D printing and 3D-printed firearms. Part II turns to the events surrounding
Defense Distributed’s creation of the world’s first 3D-printed firearm and the
subsequent government censorship of the corresponding CAD files. Part III discusses
the regulations affecting 3D-printed firearms and why these regulations are ill-suited
for CAD files and 3D-printed goods. Part IV analyzes the implications of treating
CAD files and 3D-printed goods as equivalents of traditional goods. Finally, Part V
offers a proposal for a new standard of regulating 3D-printed goods inspired by Sony
Betamax’s “substantial noninfringing uses”12 standard. Ultimately, this Comment
recommends treating CAD files as expressive free speech and suggests logically
examining the potential uses of new technologies in order to allow for the organic
development of emerging goods and technologies.
I. 3D PRINTER PRIMER
A. How a 3D Printer Works
One easy way to understand the operation of a 3D printer is to think of a real-life
topographical map: the 3D printer lays down incremental layers—one on top of
another—to build a 3D model.13 A 3D printer works in a similar fashion to a typical
2D printer—for example, an inkjet printer—but instead of printing linearly on paper,
the 3D printer extrudes, cures, or binds a variety of materials vertically on a base
layer.14 This iterative layering is called “additive manufacturing”15 and can produce
a wide variety of complete objects, separate parts combinable into a complete object,
or single replacement parts.16
While 3D printers have historically been difficult to obtain and use for the average
consumer, 3D printers have reduced in price dramatically and CAD software has

10. Id.
11. Ian Steadman, US Government Seizes 3D-Printed Gun Files, but Still Shared
Elsewhere, WIRED.CO.UK (May 10, 2013), http://www.wired.co.uk/news/archive/2013-05/10
/defcad-gun-design-taken-down.
12. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc. (Sony Betamax), 464 U.S. 417,
440 (1984).
13. Peter Jensen-Haxel, Comment, 3D Printers, Obsolete Firearm Supply Controls, and
the Right To Build Self-Defense Weapons Under Heller, 42 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 447,
449–50 (2012).
14. Kelsey B. Wilbanks, Comment, The Challenges of 3D Printing to the
Repair-Reconstruction Doctrine in Patent Law, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1147, 1152 (2013). Two
examples are the MakerBot Replicator 2, which uses extrusion, and the Peachy Printer, which is
a photolithographic printer. Makerbot, The MakerBot Replicator 2—How It Works, YOUTUBE
(Sept. 19, 2012), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AKTSdW7-H3Q; Peachy Printer, Peachy
Printer—How It Works, YOUTUBE (Sept. 18, 2013), https://www.youtube.com/watch
?v=80HsW4HmUes.
15. See Wilbanks, supra note 14, at 1152.
16. See id.
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become increasingly simplified.17 What once cost tens of thousands of dollars can
now be purchased by a curious shopper on Amazon18 for around one thousand
dollars.19 Although that price might place a 3D printer above the level of an impulse
buy, the reduction is still significant enough to bring the technology into the hands
of serious consumers or hobbyists. Further, as the availability and use of 3D printers
has increased, so too have repositories for 3D-printing designs and information.20
Thus, what was once a relatively narrow and restricted market has expanded to
hobbyists,21 designers,22 students,23 and retail outlets.24
What a 3D printer produces is only limited by the user’s imagination and the
specific printer’s capabilities. A user creates or imports a 3D object into a CAD
program, and the CAD program then slices the 3D object into thin layers.25 The
printer then prints each of these layers using the additive manufacturing process.26 In
this fashion, users have printed medical devices,27 furniture,28 instruments,29 and
even edible sculptures;30 however, designing a functional weapon—such as a
firearm—poses unique challenges.31

17. See id. at 1153–55.
18. John Biggs, Amazon Creates a 3D Printing Store, Vaulting the Technology into the
Mainstream, TECHCRUNCH (June 13, 2013), http://techcrunch.com/2013/06/13/amazon
-creates-a-3d-printing-store-vaulting-the-technology-into-the-mainstream/.
19. Richard Baguley, Best 3D Printers 2014, TOM’S GUIDE (Nov. 26, 2014, 11:00 PM),
http://www.tomsguide.com/us/best-3d-printers,news-17552.html (listing several recommended,
consumer-level 3D printers from $349–$2899).
20. See, e.g., THINGIVERSE, http://www.thingiverse.com/.
21. E.g., Knowledge Wharton, Will 3D Printing Push Past the Hobbyist Market?, FISCAL
TIMES (Sept. 2, 2013), www.thefiscaltimes.com/Articles/2013/09/02/Will-3D-Printing-Push
-Past-the-Hobbyist-Market.
22. E.g., Lakshmi Sandhana, The Room with 260 Million Surfaces: 3D Printed
Architecture Is Here, GIZMAG (Oct. 8, 2013), http://www.gizmag.com/swiss-architects
-3dprint-a-room/29299/.
23. E.g., Division of Engineering & Computing Services, 3D Printers, MICH. ST. U. C.
ENGINEERING, http://www.egr.msu.edu/decs/labs/printing/3d_printers; School of Engineering
Education, 3D Printer Lab, PURDUE U., https://engineering.purdue.edu/I2IApps/3d_printers/.
24. See, e.g., Rakesh Sharma, Staples, Office Depot and 3D Printing, FORBES.COM (Oct.
4, 2013, 6:08 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/rakeshsharma/2013/10/04/staples-office
-depot-and-3d-printing/.
25. See Jensen-Haxel, supra note 13.
26. Id.
27. E.g., Nancy Owano, British Project Uses 3D Printing for Prosthetic Eyes, PHYS.ORG
(Nov. 30, 2013), http://phys.org/news/2013-11-british-3d-prosthetic-eyes.html.
28. E.g., Signe Brewster, This Secretive Startup Plans to 3D Print Custom, Affordable
Wood Furniture, GIGAOM (Oct. 6, 2013, 8:00 AM), http://gigaom.com/2013/10/06/this
-secretive-startup-plans-to-3d-print-custom-affordable-wood-furniture/.
29. E.g., Arvid Jense, Six 3D-Printed Musical Instruments, and What 3D Printing Could
Do for Musicians, CREATE DIGITAL MUSIC (Oct. 15, 2012), http://createdigitalmusic.com
/2012/10/six-3d-printed-musical-instruments-and-what-3d-printing-could-do-for-musicians/.
30. E.g., Steph, Futuristic Food: Edible Wonders of the 3D-Printed Revolution,
WEBURBANIST (June 3, 2013), http://weburbanist.com/2013/06/03/futuristic-food-3d-printed/.
31. See, e.g., Kelsey D. Atherton, Australian Police Warn of 3-D Printed Gun Explosions,
POPULAR SCI. (May 28, 2013), http://www.popsci.com/technology/article/2013-05/australian
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B. Printing, Priming, and Resilience of a 3D-Printed Firearm
The operation of a firearm is not overly difficult to understand,32 but translating
traditional firearm designs of metal and composites to a 3D printer presents novel
issues.33 For example, how well would the plastic barrel hold up against the heat and
pressure as the bullet is fired?34 Further, how resilient would the plastic structure be
to the recoil of the firearm, and how much additional material would be needed to
stop the plastic from snapping like a plastic twig?35
Branching from these questions, when Defense Distributed initially announced its
plan to print a functioning firearm, it was met with skepticism.36 Although Defense
Distributed would eventually become the first to succeed in creating a 3D-printed
firearm, the company was hardly the first to dream up the concept of a plastic
firearm.37 Previous iterations, however, appear to have amounted to little more than
interesting ideas or rumors.38 Thus, this initial skepticism was understandable—as
the idea at the time effectively amounted to containing an explosion inside a Nerf
gun—but Defense Distributed remained confident of its goal.39 The company’s
vision to design a functional pistol became reality in May 2013—decidedly proving
skeptics wrong—and the company subsequently released several more designs.40
Building upon Defense Distributed’s proof of concept, other designers created a
variety of new 3D-printed firearms. Some of these new varieties modified Defense
Distributed’s designs, attempting to fix design flaws in the originals or modify the

-police-warn-3-d-printed-gun-failures; Alex Hern, 3D-Printed Guns: Inaccurate and Vulnerable to
Catastrophic Failure, GUARDIAN (Oct. 25, 2013, 9:59 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/uk
-news/2013/oct/25/3d-printed-guns-risk-user; Kyle Maxey, Defense Distributed Tests Their Mettle,
ENGINEERING.COM (Dec. 5, 2012), http://www.engineering.com/3DPrinting/3DPrintingArticles
/ArticleID/5038/Defense-Distributed-Tests-Their-Mettle.aspx.
32. See, e.g., Marshall Brain, How Does a Pistol Work?, HOWSTUFFWORKS (June 16,
2009, 2:00 PM), http://blogs.howstuffworks.com/2009/06/16/how-does-a-pistol-work/; see
also Kelsey D. Atherton, How the World’s First 3-D Printed Gun Works, POPULAR SCI. (May
6, 2013, 3:00 PM), http://www.popsci.com/technology/article/2013-05/worlds-first-fully-3-d
-printed-gun-here (explaining how Defense Distributed’s Liberator functions).
33. See, e.g., Maxey, supra note 31.
34. See, e.g., id.
35. See, e.g., Cyrus Farivar, “Download This Gun”: 3D-Printed Semi-Automatic Fires
over 600 Rounds, ARS TECHNICA (Mar. 1, 2013, 9:00 AM), http://arstechnica.com/tech
-policy/2013/03/download-this-gun-3d-printed-semi-automatic-fires-over-600-rounds/; Hern,
supra note 31.
36. See, e.g., Adam Clark Estes, Despite Skepticism, Cody Wilson Successfully 3D-Printed
an Entire Gun, MOTHERBOARD (May 3, 2013, 5:30 PM), http://motherboard.vice.com
/blog/despite-skepticism-cody-wilson-successfully-3d-printed-entire-gun; Greenberg, supra note 7.
37. See Steve Johnson, What Happened to the Mythical Undetectable Plastic Gun?,
FIREARM BLOG (Oct. 5, 2011), http://www.thefirearmblog.com/blog/2011/10/05/what
-happened-the-the-mythical-undetectable-plastic-gun/.
38. Id.
39. Sophie Aubrey, Printable Firearms a ‘Grave Threat’ to Australians, NEWS.COM.AU
(Apr. 3, 2013, 1:10 PM), http://www.news.com.au/technology/science/printable-firearms-a
-grave-threat-to-australians/story-fn5fsgyc-1226611704081.
40. See infra Part II.B.
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original designs for use with lower-end 3D printers.41 One company, Solid Concepts,
decided to replicate the components to the classic M1911 semi-automatic pistol in a
different medium: metal.42 The company successfully created the world’s first
3D-printed metal firearm, capable of firing at least fifty rounds, using direct metal
laser sintering (DMLS).43 This process works similarly to the more typical
plastic-extruding 3D printers, but it substitutes the plastic and plastic-melting
components for metal powder and a powerful, focused laser beam.44 While Solid
Concepts’ announcement prompted some individuals to make apocalyptic
predictions,45 a company spokesperson was quick to point out that its DMLS printer
is an industrial printer46 and “costs more than my college tuition (and I went to a
private university).”47 Thus, while the concept of a 3D-printed metal firearm presents
an intriguing—and perhaps ominous—hint at one avenue of 3D-printing technology,
it is unlikely that we will be seeing metal, 3D-printed arsenals anytime in the near
future; at any rate, Defense Distributed’s origin is far humbler than Solid Concept’s
vast wealth of tools and knowledge.
II. DEFENSE DISTRIBUTED AND THE WORLD’S FIRST FUNCTIONAL
3D-PRINTED FIREARM
A. Founding and Mission
In August 2012, Cody Wilson—a twenty-four-year-old law student at the
University of Texas—and a small group of his friends founded Defense
Distributed.48 Defense Distributed sought “to raise $20,000 to design and release
blueprints for a plastic gun anyone can create with a[] . . . 3D printer . . . .”49 As
Wilson stated,
We want to show this principle: That a handgun is printable. . . . You
don’t need to be able to put 200 rounds through it. . . . It only has to fire

41. See, e.g., Andy Greenberg, $25 Gun Created with Cheap 3D Printer Fires Nine Shots
(Video), FORBES.COM (May 20, 2013, 11:51 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites
/andygreenberg/2013/05/20/25-gun-created-with-cheap-3d-printer-fires-nine-shots-video/.
42. Samuel Gibbs, First Metal 3D Printed Gun is Capable of Firing 50 Shots, GUARDIAN
(Nov. 8, 2013, 9:36 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2013/nov/08/metal-3d
-printed-gun-50-shots; Victoria Turk, You Don’t Need To Worry About 3D-Printed Metal Guns,
MOTHERBOARD (Nov. 8, 2013, 9:45 AM), http://motherboard.vice.com/blog/you-dont-need-to
-worry-about-the-worlds-first-3d-printed-metal-gun.
43. See Gibbs, supra note 42.
44. Id.
45. See, e.g., Alexis Kleinman, Now There’s a 3D-Printed Gun Made Out of Metal, and
We’re Doomed, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 8, 2013, 2:33 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com
/2013/11/07/3d-printed-gun-metal_n_4234900.html.
46. See Gibbs, supra note 42.
47. See Turk, supra note 42. The DMLS machine costs approximately $850,000 and is
probably out of most individuals’ price ranges. See Kleinman, supra note 45.
48. See Greenberg, supra note 1.
49. See id.
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once. But even if the design is a little unworkable, it doesn’t matter, as
long as it has that guarantee of lethality.50
Wilson described himself as a “crypto-anarchist”—that is, a person seeking the
free flow of data and an end to government surveillance and censorship.51
Crypto-anarchism grew largely out of an online movement in the 1980s involving a
group of cryptography activists known as the Cypherpunks.52 Notable members of
the Cypherpunks included WikiLeaks’ Julian Assange, as well as technology and
politics writer Tim May.53 It is understandable then, based on this philosophy at least,
why Wilson sought to release the firearm design to the public.
While Defense Distributed’s mission might be read by some as the pursuit of an
undetectable, lethal weapon,54 others consider the company’s mission to be one of
“the greatest piece[s] of political performance art in this new century.”55 Although
this might seem to be a strained interpretation of the project, others give further
credence to the idea, comparing Defense Distributed’s mission for 3D printers with
the printing press and early printing restrictions.56 Even if this may not be a pinnacle
of performance art of our age, Defense Distributed’s creations certainly pose
intriguing First and Second Amendment questions. Whatever the perceived scope of
Defense Distributed’s mission might be, the potential ripple of influence created by
Defense Distributed—directly or indirectly—is undeniable.
B. Concept and Creations
Despite Wilson’s optimism, Defense Distributed experienced a number of
setbacks as it worked to design its working prototypes. Starting from its rather
ambitious goal of creating a functional 3D-printed firearm, Defense Distributed
launched fundraising efforts on the crowdfunding website Indiegogo.57 Defense

50. See id.
51. Joshua Kopstein, Guns Want To Be Free: What Happens When 3D Printing and
Crypto-Anarchy Collide?, VERGE (Apr. 12, 2013, 9:30 AM), http://www.theverge.com
/2013/4/12/4209364/guns-want-to-be-free-what-happens-when-3d-printing-and-crypto
-anarchy; see also Timothy C. May, The Crypto Anarchist Manifesto, ACTIVISM.NET (Nov. 22,
1992, 12:11 PM), http://www.activism.net/cypherpunk/crypto-anarchy.html (reciting the
origin manifesto of Crypto-Anarchism).
52. DJ Pangburn, Whistleblowers and the Crypto-Anarchist Underground: An Interview
with Andy Greenberg, MOTHERBOARD (Sept. 19, 2013, 3:05 PM), http://motherboard.vice.com
/blog/whisteblowers-and-the-crypto-anarchist-underground-an-interview-with-andy-greenberg.
53. Id.
54. See Greenberg, supra note 7.
55. Aaron Timms, The Future of 3D Printing Might Be Scarier Than You Thought,
BLOUIN NEWS (Mar. 29, 2013), http://blogs.blouinnews.com/blouinbeattechnology/2013
/03/29/the-future-of-3d-printing-might-be-scarier-than-you-thought/.
56. Philip Bump, How Defense Distributed Already Upended the World, WIRE (May 10,
2013, 7:18 PM), http://www.thewire.com/technology/2013/05/how-defense-distributed-already
-upended-world/65126/.
57. Erin Lee Car, Click, Print, Gun: The Inside Story of the 3D-Printed Gun Movement,
MOTHERBOARD (Mar. 25, 2013, 11:19 AM), http://motherboard.vice.com/read/click-print
-gun-the-inside-story-of-the-3d-printed-gun-movement-video.
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Distributed wanted to raise $20,000 “to design and build the world’s first entirely
3D-printed handgun.”58 Indiegogo, however, summarily removed the project from
its website and refunded the pool of donations to the respective donors.59 Indiegogo
explained later that the project “violated Indiegogo’s terms of service, which don’t
allow the sale of ‘ammunition, firearms, or certain firearm parts or accessories.’”60
Despite Indiegogo’s rejection, Defense Distributed moved the fundraising efforts to
its own website and, within a short period, managed to raise more than its previous
$20,000 goal.61 The group created the pistol—capable of firing a .380 caliber
bullet—using an $8000 3D printer in a small workshop in Austin, Texas.62 The
design relies almost entirely on plastic for the pistol; “[t]he only non-printed piece is
a common hardware store nail used as its firing pin.”63 The only other nonprinted,
nonplastic part—which is effectively superfluous to the operation of the pistol—is a
“six ounce cube of non-functional steel” that fits into the pistol body for compliance
with the Undetectable Firearms Act.64 And so, despite all the skepticism and
setbacks, Defense Distributed achieved its goal of firing at least one shot,65 and the
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) later found the bullets
fired from the Liberator were lethal.66
While Defense Distributed’s vision looked to the future, the group looked to the
past for inspiration in its design. Specifically, Defense Distributed invoked a rebellious
tone for the Liberator by naming it after the FP-45 Liberator,67 “a single-shot weapon
produced by the Allies during World War 2 and airdropped to resistance fighters in
France and China.”68 Although “there[ is] no evidence that the FP-45 was ever used in
combat,”69 it would appear that Defense Distributed channeled the symbolism of its
namesake: “[T]he idea that there were a million guns floating around behind enemy
lines was enough to reduce the morale of Axis troops. . . . [I]t’s clear that Wilson hopes
that his Liberator will have the same effect on the US government.”70 Thus, while
Defense Distributed created a functional firearm, it also imbued its creation with a
historically and politically significant message.

58. Andy Greenberg, 3D-Printable Gun Project Hits Its Fundraising Goal Despite Being
Booted off Indiegogo, FORBES.COM (Sept. 20, 2012, 9:49 AM), http://www.forbes.com
/sites/andygreenberg/2012/09/20/3d-printed-gun-project-hits-its-fundraising-goal-despite
-being-booted-off-indiegogo/.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. See Greenberg, supra note 7.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. See Greenberg, supra note 1; see also supra text accompanying note 50.
66. Ryan J. Reilly, Feds Printed Their Own 3D Gun and It Literally Blew Up in Their
Faces, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 14, 2013, 10:40 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com
/2013/11/13/3d-guns-atf_n_4269303.html.
67. See Sebastian Anthony, The Liberator: The First Downloadable 3D-Printed Gun Gets
Test Fired, EXTREMETECH (May 6, 2013, 6:23 AM), http://www.extremetech.com
/extreme/155084-the-liberator-the-first-downloadable-3d-printed-gun-gets-test-fired.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. (emphasis in original).
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In addition to the Liberator, Defense Distributed also designed and created a
functional lower receiver for an AR-15,71 an extended AR-15 magazine,72 and an
extended magazine for the AK-47.73 Versions of these designs proved capable as
functional firearm components.74 For example, a design for a 3D-printed AR-15 lower
receiver—the part housing the trigger and gripped by the operator—improved from
initially breaking after only six rounds to being capable of firing over six-hundred
rounds.75 Although a component life of six-hundred rounds is not comparable to
traditional weapon performance, it represents a significant improvement in the design
over time and suggests further refinement is possible. Defense Distributed’s
achievements, however, did not go unnoticed by the U.S. government.
C. “Voluntary” Censorship
On May 8, 2013—a mere three days after publishing the Liberator CAD files for
the public to download—the U.S. Department of State requested that Defense
Distributed remove its download links for the Liberator and a number of other
accessories and weapons.76 The State Department alleged that Defense Distributed’s
CAD files fell under the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) as technical
data, and therefore the company was required to remove the files from public access
until the State Department could check for ITAR applicability and compliance.77
In response to the State Department’s demands, Defense Distributed “voluntarily”
removed the CAD files from its website—albeit not without public comment.78
While the State Department’s notice technically did not state that the CAD files
violated the ITAR, it seems reasonable from the speed of the State Department’s
response that the Department considered the Liberator to be a threat. But, in an
interview after the takedown, Defense Distributed’s Cody Wilson made clear that the
company’s compliance was ultimately of little consequence:

71. See Farivar, supra note 35. An AR-15 is effectively the civilian version of the M16
rifle used by the U.S. military. See Max R. Popenker, Armalite / Colt AR-15 / M16 M16A1
M16A2 M16A3 M16A4 Assault Rifle (USA), WORLD GUNS, http://world.guns.ru/assault
/usa/m16-m16a1-m16a2-m16a3-e.html.
72. See Greenberg, supra note 7.
73. See id. An AK-47—signifying the firearm’s official name, Avtomat Kalashnikova,
and the year of the model, 1947—is an assault rifle capable of firing six-hundred rounds per
minute, designed in the 1940s by the Soviet Union and still used throughout the world. Max
R. Popenker, Kalashnikov AK (AK-47) AKS, AKM and AKMS Assault Rifles (USSR), WORLD
GUNS, http://world.guns.ru/assault/rus/ak-akm-e.html.
74. See, e.g., Farivar, supra note 35.
75. See id.
76. Letter from Glenn E. Smith, Chief, Enforcement Division, U.S. Dep’t of State, to Cody
Wilson, Defense Distributed (May 8, 2013) [hereinafter Takedown Letter], available at
http://www.scribd.com/doc/140471313/Letter-from-Department-of-State-to-Defense-Distributed.
77. Id.; see also Amendments to the International Traffic in Arms Regulations, 58 Fed.
Reg. 39,280 (July 22, 1993) (codified at 22 C.F.R. pts. 120–130).
78. See, e.g., Andy Greenberg, State Department Demands Takedown of 3D-Printable Gun
Files for Possible Export Control Violations, FORBES.COM (May 9, 2013, 2:36 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/andygreenberg/2013/05/09/state-department-demands-takedown
-of-3d-printable-gun-for-possible-export-control-violation/; Roy, supra note 9.
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I immediately complied and I’ve taken down the files . . . [b]ut this is a
much bigger deal than guns. It has implications for the freedom of the
web. . . . I still think we win in the end . . . [b]ecause the files are all over
the Internet, the Pirate Bay has it—to think this can be stopped in any
meaningful way is to misunderstand what the future of distributive
technologies is about.79
Wilson’s statement is at least partially accurate: the Defense Distributed CAD
files, along with many others, are freely available on the Internet.80
It is because of this oddity of “compliance without effect” that traditional
regulation and censorship fight for relevance in the technological arena. Compared
to the past, when killing a dissident, burning books, or shutting down a printing press
would stop dissenting speech81 (if only for a while), dissidents can now take to the
Internet to reach a worldwide audience, spreading their messages in easily
reproducible text, audio, and video.82 In this respect, Wilson’s message reached, and
continues to reach, the intended audience,83 and Defense Distributed’s designs
escaped any real government restraint.84 Thus, regardless of whether the U.S.
Department of State admits it or not, it may have won the battle, but it lost the war.
III. REGULATIONS AFFECTING 3D-PRINTED FIREARMS
Given the hypothetical scenario of a 3D-printed arsenal, it is unsurprising that
some might worry about possible misuses of the technology. The potential for
misuse, whether accidental or intentional, poses serious demands on traditional
firearms regulations.85 While the U.S. Department of State looked to the ITAR,86
others have suggested using the Undetectable Firearms Act87 or the Invention
Secrecy Act to limit the proliferation of 3D-printed firearms.88 These regulations may

79. Roy, supra note 9.
80. See, e.g., id.; see also Derek Mead, With 3D-Printed Gun Files Safely on the Pirate Bay,
What’s Next?, MOTHERBOARD (May 10, 2013, 11:20 AM), http://motherboard.vice.com/blog/with
-3d-printed-gun-files-safely-on-the-pirate-bay-whats-next-1 (describing file availability).
81. See Van Vechten Veeder, The History and Theory of Law of Defamation, 3 COLUM.
L. REV. 547, 561–63 (1903).
82. See, e.g., Anonymous Hackers Engaged in Year-Long Campaign Targeting US Govt
Agencies—FBI, RT.COM (Dec. 25, 2013, 8:41 AM), http://rt.com/usa/anonymous-government
-campaign-fbi-814/; TheAnonMessage, Anonymous—Operation Defense (CISPA), YOUTUBE
(Apr. 7, 2012), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=v8no3E0Hx7k.
83. See, e.g., Greenberg, supra note 41.
84. See, e.g., Mead, supra note 80.
85. For example, while manufacturing a firearm in the past required machining
knowledge and tools, how does a government regulate potential firearm manufacturers if
anyone with a 3D printer is capable of producing a functional firearm?
86. See supra text accompanying notes 76–77.
87. See, e.g., Jacob Kastrenakes, Senator Warns of 3D-Printed Gun Dangers as
Undetectable Firearm Ban Nears Expiration, VERGE (Nov. 18, 2013, 12:32 PM),
http://www.theverge.com/2013/11/18/5117990/schumer-pushes-undetectable-firearm-act
-extension-3d-printed-gun-warning.
88. See, e.g., Jose Abreu, Obama Regime Begins Using Invention Secrecy Act to Suppress
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have some degree of efficacy in limiting 3D-printed firearms, but ultimately these
regulatory schemes are becoming rapidly inadequate to deal with emerging
technologies such as 3D printers.
A. International Traffic in Arms Regulations
1. Background and Use
The ITAR89 was enacted in 1976 during the Cold War, ostensibly to protect U.S.
interests domestically and internationally.90 This set of regulations specifically limits
the export91 or import of defense- and military-related goods and information that
appear on the U.S. Munitions List (USML) to a “foreign person.”92 The USML
includes a surprisingly extensive catalog, arranged in twenty categories,93 including
firearms;94 ammunition;95 missiles;96 explosives and propellants;97 ships;98 tanks;99
aircraft;100 military training equipment;101 personal protective equipment;102
toxicological agents;103 spacecraft;104 submarines;105 and any technical data, articles,
or services that the government deems classified, whether enumerated in the USML
or not.106 In fact, the USML is so broad that it may be difficult to contemplate any
weapon or technology that a defense-related agency could not restrict based loosely
upon some clause of the USML.107 Whatever the breadth, however, the ITAR

Guns, ABREU REP. (Aug. 20, 2013), http://www.abreureport.com/2013/08/obama-regimebegins-using-inventions.html.
89. 22 C.F.R. §§ 120–130 (2014); see also Amendments to the International Traffic in
Arms Regulations, 58 Fed. Reg. 39,280 (July 22, 1993) (codified at 22 C.F.R. pts. 120–130).
90. Dan L. Burk, Patenting Speech, 79 TEX. L. REV. 99, 103–04 (2000).
91. 22 C.F.R. § 120.17 (defining “export”).
92. 22 C.F.R. § 120.16 (defining “foreign person” to be “any natural person who is not a
lawful permanent resident as defined by 8 U.S.C. [§] 1101(a)(20) or who is not a protected
individual as defined by 8 U.S.C. [§] 1324b(a)(3)” as well as “any foreign corporation,
business association, partnership, trust, society or any other entity or group that is not
incorporated or organized to do business in the United States, as well as international
organizations, foreign governments and any agency or subdivision of foreign governments
(e.g., diplomatic missions)”).
93. 22 C.F.R. § 121.1 (enumerating Categories I–XX).
94. Id. (enumerating firearms under Category I).
95. Id. (enumerating ammunition and ordnance under Category III).
96. Id. (enumerating missiles under Category IV).
97. Id. (enumerating explosives and propellants under Category V).
98. Id. (enumerating various naval categories under Category VI).
99. Id. (enumerating tanks and military ground vehicles under Category VII).
100. Id. (enumerating aircraft and related articles under Category VIII).
101. Id. (enumerating military training equipment and training under Category IX).
102. Id. (enumerating personal protective equipment and shelters under Category X).
103. Id. (enumerating toxicological agents under Category XIV).
104. Id. (enumerating spacecraft under Category XV).
105. Id. (enumerating submarines under Category XX).
106. Id. (including nonenumerated classified articles, technical data, and defense services
under Category XVII).
107. For example, Category IX—Military Training Equipment and Training includes under
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principally regulates U.S. goods or information from finding its way into the hands
of foreign persons—which effectively amounts to non-U.S. citizens.108
However, it appears that Defense Distributed’s mere posting of its CAD files on
the Internet constituted an export in the eyes of the Department of State. The
takedown demand sent to Defense Distributed noted,
Defense Distributed may have released ITAR-controlled technical data
without the required prior authorization from the Directorate of Defense
Trade Controls (DDTC), a violation of the ITAR.
Technical data regulated under the ITAR refers to information
required for the design, development, production, manufacture,
assembly, operation, repair, testing, maintenance or modification of
defense articles, including information in the form of blueprints,
drawings, photographs, plans, instructions or documentation. . . .
Pursuant to § 127.1 of the ITAR, it is unlawful to export any defense
article or technical data for which a license or written approval is required
without first obtaining the required authorization from the DDTC. . . .
Until the Department provides Defense Distributed with final
[Commodity Jurisdiction] determinations, Defense Distributed should
treat the [CAD files listed in the takedown demand] as ITAR-controlled.
This means that all such data should be removed from public access
immediately.109
Because Defense Distributed’s CAD files had already been downloaded by over one
hundred thousand users,110 perhaps it is only natural for the State Department to

section (b) “[s]imulation devices for the items covered by this subchapter” and under section (d)
“[c]omponents, parts, accessories, attachments, and associated equipment specifically designed,
modified, configured, or adapted for the articles in paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of this category.”
Id. (enumerating military training equipment and training under Category IX). Under these
definitions, and considering the U.S. military’s use of video games as training tools, it would not
be too absurd to see the Department of Defense arguing for restrictions on new virtual reality
devices (e.g., Oculus Rift), military-based games (e.g., Arma 2), or representative controllers
(e.g., controllers in the shape of an M4 assault rifle). See, e.g., Sebastian Anthony,
Omnidirectional Treadmill + Oculus Rift = At-Home Virtual Reality Finally Arrives,
EXTREMETECH (Apr. 22, 2013, 7:58 AM), http://www.extremetech.com/extreme/153919
-omnidirectional-treadmill-oculus-rift-at-home-virtual-reality-finally-arrives (describing virtual
reality devices); Damien Gayle, The Games Controller that Looks Just Like a Real Gun: Fears
Over Latest Xbox Gadget Designed To Resemble Military-Grade Weapon, MAIL ONLINE (Oct.
8, 2012, 11:11 AM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-2214609/The-games
-controller-mistaken-real-gun--fears-latest-Xbox-addon.html (describing Delta Six controller);
Hamza Shaban, Playing War: How the Military Uses Video Games, ATLANTIC (Oct. 10, 2013,
5:04
PM),
http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2013/10/playing-war-how-the
-military-uses-video-games/280486/ (describing U.S. military’s use of video games).
108. See Burk, supra note 90, at 104 ("This system of review and licensing was originally
designed to keep munitions technology out of the hands of the Soviet Union, but since the end
of the Cold War the system is now (supposedly) employed to keep the technology out of the
hands of terrorists, drug lords, child pornographers, and other targets of law enforcement
investigation.” (footnote omitted)).
109. Takedown Letter, supra note 76, at 1–2 (emphasis added).
110. Andy Greenberg, 3D-Printed Gun’s Blueprints Downloaded 100,000 Times in Two
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automatically assume some of those users were foreign persons, but the takedown
demand never actually makes this assertion.111 Instead, the Department flatly stated,
“Defense Distributed may have released ITAR-controlled technical data,”112
“Defense Distributed should treat the [CAD files listed in the takedown demand] as
ITAR-controlled,”113 and “all such data should be removed from public access
immediately.”114 However, it is unlikely that Defense Distributed felt that these
demands were anything but mandatory if the company wanted to avoid legal action
from the State Department.115 The Department of State effectively proceeded on a
presumption of “guilty until proven to comply with ITAR-regulations,” despite
failing to offer any actual evidence of an export to a foreign individual.116 If nothing
else, such a thinly veiled threat should be treated as an inadequate and unenforceable
request, just as an insufficient notice-and-takedown request under the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act would be treated.117
Thus, the foundation for the ITAR-based demand was at least foundationally
lacking in this instance—although it appeared to serve the State Department’s
purpose—however, Defense Distributed’s “voluntary” compliance was a hollow
victory. While the government may claim a victory now, the future effectiveness of
the ITAR faces clear challenges with the ever-increasing connectivity and
decentralization of the Internet.118
2. De Facto Obsolescence of the ITAR
While the regulations under the ITAR may have experienced greater effectiveness
in the pre-Information Age, that trend is unlikely to continue. Although the physical
export and import of tanks, submarines, and spacecraft will remain viable targets for
the ITAR, technical data is far more likely to be sent than a physical article today.119
Try as it might, the U.S. government cannot possibly prevent every leak of

Days (With Some Help from Kim Dotcom), FORBES.COM (May 8, 2013, 5:12 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/andygreenberg/2013/05/08/3d-printed-guns-blueprints
-downloaded-100000-times-in-two-days-with-some-help-from-kim-dotcom/.
111. See Takedown Letter, supra note 76.
112. Id. at 1 (emphasis added).
113. Id. at 2 (emphasis added).
114. Id. (emphasis added).
115. See Roy, supra note 9 (noting that even though Wilson believed Defense Distributed
to be immune from the State Department’s review procedures, he still immediately complied
with the demands).
116. See Takedown Letter, supra note 76.
117. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3) (2012) (limiting liability of service provider in event of
faulty copyright notice). While this analogy seems particularly relevant due to the nature and
medium of the data offense and is deserving of scholarly review, such review is beyond the
scope of this Comment.
118. That is, the fracturing of centralized communications networks controlled by a few
entities into individual devices in the hands of individuals.
119. Cf. Geoffrey Ingersoll, REPORT: Chinese Hackers Stole Plans for Dozens of Critical
US Weapons Systems, BUS. INSIDER (May 28, 2013, 11:11 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com
/china-hacked-us-military-weapons-systems-2013-5 (discussing the theft of digital U.S. military
technology plans and personal information via hacking and “human engineering”).
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information,120 and dissidents can send this data instantly, globally, and, sometimes,
anonymously.121 On top of this aging issue, the ITAR is inherently limited as an export
control measure, leaving gaping domestic loopholes.122 Put simply, the ITAR is not
effective in preventing the exchange of data or new technologies in today’s world.
To understand the ITAR’s ineffectiveness against the dissemination of Defense
Distributed’s CAD files, one need only consider the ITAR’s enforcement scope. While
the USML is remarkably vast, the targets of prohibition are still non-U.S. citizens.123
Hypothetically, what limitations would the ITAR place on Defense Distributed if the
company had limited the distribution of its CAD files to only lawful U.S. citizens?124
There would no longer be an export to a foreign person for the ITAR to regulate. Many
commentators fear the proliferation of plastic firearms being used by foreign
terrorists,125 but the ITAR does nothing to prevent a U.S. citizen—who is not otherwise
classified as a foreign person—from obtaining CAD files from another U.S. citizen and
creating the exact same harm. The ITAR’s effect is nullified simply by changing the
destination, but the potential harm is still clearly present.
Additionally, once the technical data—in this case CAD files—reaches the
Internet, the ITAR has effectively failed. Whether this technical data reaches the
public from an inventor like Defense Distributed or from a U.S. citizen that received
the data legally, the disclosure is nearly irreversible.126 While the same can be said
for most laws that are reactive in nature,127 sending technical data differs in one major
aspect: ease of action. It is no longer necessary to transfer physical goods across

120. See, e.g., Amar Toor, Pentagon Papers Whistleblower Says NSA Leak Is Most Important
in US History, VERGE (June 10, 2013, 8:43 AM), http://www.theverge.com/2013
/6/10/4413936/daniel-ellsberg-edward-snowden-nsa-leak-more-important-than-pentagon-papers
(referencing multiple information leaks).
121. See, e.g., Adi Robertson, NSA Tried and Failed To Compromise Tor, but Browser
Vulnerabilities Gave Some Users Away, VERGE (Oct. 4, 2013, 12:00 PM), http://
www.theverge.com/2013/10/4/4802512/nsa-failed-to-compromise-tor-network-but-exploited
-browser-vulnerabilities.
122. For example, while transfer of ITAR-controlled articles or information to a foreign
individual would be regulated by ITAR, transfer of that same article or information between
two U.S. citizens with no foreign ties, in person and in the United States, would neither
implicate a foreign person nor an import or export.
123. See Burk, supra note 90, at 104.
124. While this hypothetical poses obvious verification and fraud possibilities, the
implication for conflict within the hypothetical remains tangible.
125. See, e.g., Andy Greenberg, 3D-Printed Guns as Art: London Design Museum Buys Two
‘Liberator’ Printed Pistols, FORBES.COM (Sept. 15, 2013, 4:23 PM), http://www.forbes.com
/sites/andygreenberg/2013/09/15/3d-printed-guns-as-art-london-design-museum-buys-two
-liberator-printed-pistols/ (noting Senator Schumer’s comments).
126. See Mead, supra note 80; see also, e.g., Unflattering Beyoncé, KNOW YOUR MEME
(Feb. 7, 2013, 2:16 AM), http://knowyourmeme.com/memes/unflattering-beyonce (last
modified Dec. 3, 2013) (documenting Streisand Effect in conjunction with pictures of singer
Beyoncé from Super Bowl XLVII).
127. For example, it would be illogical to charge an individual with aiding, planning, or
committing a murder until he commences such activities. Doing so would effectively amount
to a thoughtcrime. See generally GEORGE ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR (1987)
(popularizing concept of thoughtcrime).
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borders when the data can be effortlessly shared over the Internet, and once
Pandora’s Box is opened by this transfer, the ITAR fails.
Thus, the ITAR faces issues both in preventing information transfer to foreign and
domestic persons alike. While the State Department took down one source of
Defense Distributed’s CAD files, does this even matter when any individual around
the world can still download the files? Further, does the perceived oppression and
subsequent backlash from the enforcement do more harm than good? Whatever the
answer—which will surely be a major point of contention in the years to come—the
ITAR has some viable uses for the physical transfer of articles or information, but
the Information Age has quickly antiquated the ITAR’s effectiveness. This
antiquation, however, is not limited to the ITAR.
B. Undetectable Firearms Act
1. Background and Use
In addition to the ITAR, several authorities and commentators128 have noted that
3D-printed plastic firearms should be banned under the Undetectable Firearms Act
of 1988 (UFA).129 Specifically, the UFA states,
It shall be unlawful for any person to manufacture, import, sell, ship,
deliver, possess, transfer, or receive any firearm—
(A) [that] . . . is not as detectable as [3.7 ounces of stainless steel], by
walk-through metal detectors . . . or
(B) any major component of which, when subjected to inspection by
the types of x-ray machines commonly used at airports, does not generate
an image that accurately depicts the shape of the component.130
The Act was largely a reaction to polymer components like those used in Glock
firearms.131 At the time, some groups took to naming Glock firearms “terrorist
specials”132 for their use of plastics instead of metal, which lessened the detectable
signatures of the weapon.133 Several gun advocacy groups, such as the National Rifle
Association (NRA), eventually supported a compromise version of the UFA
“bann[ing] the future production and sale of firearms with less than four ounces of
metal,”134 and President Reagan signed the UFA into law.135

128. See, e.g., 3D Plastic Guns: US Lawmakers Seek Ban on National Security Grounds,
RT.COM (Nov. 15, 2013, 11:43 AM), http://rt.com/usa/banning-undetectable-plastic-firearms-697/.
129. Undetectable Firearms Act of 1988, 18 U.S.C. § 922(p) (2012).
130. Id. § 922(p)(1).
131. See Dave Kopel, The Cheney Glock-n-Spiel, DAVE KOPEL (July. 27, 2000, 10:45 AM),
http://www.davekopel.com/NRO/2000/The-Cheney-Glock-n-Spiel.htm; MAC, 3D Guns Still
Scaring People, BANG SWITCH (July 5, 2013, 3:21 PM), http://www.thebangswitch.com/3d
-guns-still-scaring-people-3/.
132. See Kopel, supra note 131.
133. See id.
134. Id.
135. Matt Sledge, Undetectable Firearms Act: Rep. Steve Israel Pushes for Renewal as
Defense Distributed Pulls Prank, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 2, 2013, 2:22 AM),
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Since being signed into law in 1988, Congress renewed the UFA in 1998 and
2003.136 The Act nearly expired on December 9, 2013,137 but several
Congresspersons—including Representative Steve Israel and Senator Chuck
Schumer—strongly pushed for a renewal of the Act, this time using 3D-printed
weapons as a rallying cry.138 Senator Schumer stated, “The expiration of this law,
combined with advances in 3D-printing, make what was once a hypothetical threat into
a terrifying reality.”139 To this end, both Senator Schumer and Representative Israel
introduced proposals for extending the UFA.140 Interestingly, Representative Israel’s
proposal also adds ammunition magazines and firearm receivers to the previously
regulated list of undetectable components;141 additions that are potentially due to
Defense Distributed’s creation of 3D-printed magazines and receivers.142
However, despite the dour predictions of so many individuals, the basic principle
of the UFA remains the same: firearm components must be detectable by airport
scanners and detectors. This basic principle of detection, however, is also the UFA’s
largest weakness. As long as the design is detectable, or as long as the good is not
actually a firearm, then the UFA does not apply.
2. De Facto Obsolescence of the UFA
Much like the challenges facing the ITAR, the UFA will most likely face a similar
reduction in effectiveness even if Congress again extends the UFA. Also like the
ITAR, the UFA’s primary issue is one of scope. While the ITAR’s export and import
scope limits the law’s applicability for domestic use, the UFA’s scope limits
applicability to firearms not meeting the minimum detection thresholds. Assuming a
3D-printed firearm has a detectable signature equal to a 3.7 ounce stainless steel
block and the firearm’s major components are detectable by an airport x-ray scanner,
the 3D-printed firearm is not in violation with the UFA.143
Aside from the obvious fact that a CAD file is no more a functional, regulated
firearm under the UFA than a picture of a nuclear bomb is a functional, regulated
bomb, Defense Distributed took the UFA’s requirements into account when
designing its weapons.144 The group’s CAD files, or at least the high-profile ones,

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/04/01/undetectable-firearms-act-steve-israel-defense
-distributed_n_2994020.html.
136. See 3D Plastic Guns: US Lawmakers Seek Ban on National Security Grounds, supra
note 128.
137. See Michael Weinberg, Undetectable Firearms Law Passes Without 3D Printing,
PUB. KNOWLEDGE (Dec. 10, 2013), http://publicknowledge.org/blog/undetectable-firearms
-law-passes-without-3d-p.
138. See, e.g., 3D Plastic Guns: US Lawmakers Seek Ban on National Security, supra note
128; Rich Brown, The Undetectable Firearms Act and 3D-Printed Guns (FAQ), CNET NEWS
(Dec. 10, 2012, 1:49 PM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-11386_3-57558213-76/the-undetectable
-firearms-act-and-3d-printed-guns-faq/;Weinberg, supra note 137.
139. See 3D Plastic Guns: US Lawmakers Seek Ban on National Security, supra note 128.
140. Weinberg, supra note 137.
141. Undetectable Firearms Modernization Act, H.R. 1474, 113th Cong. (1st Sess. 2013).
142. See Greenberg, supra note 7.
143. See Brown, supra 138.
144. See Greenberg, supra note 7 (describing the insertion of a six ounce cube of
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did comply with the UFA. The AR-15 and AK-47 receivers did not violate the UFA
because receivers were exempted from the definition of “firearm,”145 and magazines
were similarly exempted.146 Both of these exclusions are arguably why
Representative Israel’s proposal aims to expand the UFA’s scope to include these
designs.147 Additionally, the Liberator—perhaps the best known design released by
Defense Distributed—specifically included a six ounce block of metal for the express
purpose of complying with the UFA.148 While some might see the inclusion of this
block as “extraneous,”149 the fact remains that the Liberator’s design expressly calls
for the inclusion of a detectable block, which brings a real-life Liberator design into
UFA compliance.
Further, even if the metal block is extraneous, the violation for removing the block
should not create liability for Defense Distributed. By analogy, a driver’s removal of
a seatbelt, airbags, and brakes from an automobile manufacturer’s designs clearly
would not impose liability on Ford or General Motors. Additionally, even if the user
removed the metal block in violation of the UFA, the bullets and firing pin (a nail)
are still detectable by most—if not all—properly functioning metal detectors,150 and
without either of these components the gun is effectively a plastic toy. While this is
not to say that the plastic firearm, bullets, and a firing pin could not slip past
screening and pose a very real threat, the same could also be said for traditional
weapons.151 As some have noted, “At the moment plastic guns are unlikely to pose
any more threat to American society than the estimated 300 million + conventional
weapons already owned by Americans.”152 The Liberator’s design calls for a
detectable block that is fifty percent greater than the UFA requires, and failure by a
user to adhere to the design should not create liability in the CAD file’s designer.

nonfunctional steel to enable detection by a metal detector).
145. Undetectable Firearms Act of 1988, 18 U.S.C. § 922(p)(2)(A) (2012) (exempting the
frame or receiver from the definition of firearm).
146. See id. § 922(p)(1)(A).
147. See supra text accompanying notes 141–42.
148. See Greenberg, supra note 7.
149. J.D. Tuccille, 3D-Printed Handgun Prompts Congressman To Propose Impotent
Legislation, REASON.COM (May 4, 2013, 11:55 AM), http://reason.com/blog/2013/05/04/3d
-printed-handgun-prompts-congressman-t.
150. Metal detectors can be tuned to certain levels of sensitivity, but anyone who has been
stopped for two pennies in a pocket or a belt bucket can readily attest that 3.7 ounces of stainless
steel would surely set off many detectors. See, e.g., Michael Bernzweig, Understanding and
Selecting Walk Through Security Metal Detectors, METALDETECTOR.COM (2008),
http://www.metaldetector.com/learn/buying-guide-articles/security-use/understanding-selecting
-walk-through-security-metal-detectors. For comparison, 3.7 ounces is roughly equal to 105
grams—or about the weight of a stick of butter. How Much Is 100 Grams?,
HEALTHALICIOUSNESS.COM, http://www.healthaliciousness.com/blog/How-much-is-100-grams.php.
151. See Matthew Mosk, Angela Hill & Timothy Fleming, Gaping Holes in Airline
Security: Loaded Gun Slips Past TSA Screeners, ABC NEWS (Dec. 16, 2010),
http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/loaded-gun-slips-past-tsa-screeners/story?id=12412458.
152. See 3D Plastic Guns: US Lawmakers Seek Ban on National Security Grounds, supra
note 128.

2015]

UNLOCKED AND LOADED

917

Finally, recent improvements in 3D-printing technology allowing a user to print
metal guns153 would make the UFA a moot point if the user printed a metal gun
instead of a plastic gun. If, for example, an individual printed a replica M1911—a
gun that clearly exceeds the 3.7 ounce requirement154—this firearm would not run
afoul of the UFA. While metal-based 3D printing is not economically feasible at this
point in time,155 the price of metal-based 3D-printing will most likely decrease—as
new technology tends to do156—and such 3D printing may be subject to much lower
barriers to entry than exist currently. Thus, the current focus on criminals printing
undetectable firearms157 could rapidly evolve into criminals printing any firearm, but
these firearms could be readily identifiable by airport scanners and therefore elude
the UFA’s scope.
Thus, while the UFA is so often touted as a perfect solution to plastic firearms, it
is far from flawless, and the UFA is unlikely to prevent the actual design and
distribution of CAD files. While a 3D-printed firearm may violate the UFA, Defense
Distributed’s designs—by the group’s express intent158—did not violate the UFA.
Even if a user of Defense Distributed’s CAD files removed the detectable block of
metal, it is hard to imagine Defense Distributed being charged with a subsequent
UFA violation.159 Finally, continued advances in 3D-printing mediums may entirely
sidestep the metal-content issue. For these reasons, the UFA is, and will most likely
continue to be, a nonstarter to any actual control of 3D-printed firearm designs.
C. Invention Secrecy Act
1. Background and Use
Finally, some advocate for the use of the Invention Secrecy Act of 1951 (ISA)160
to control influxes of new technology.161 Starting during the First World War, the
U.S. government wished to control certain technologies that might harm the
well-being of the United States.162 Along these lines, Congress authorized the U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) to temporarily restrict access and publication
of these technologies.163 These efforts diminished after the end of the First World

153. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
154. M1911A1 .45 Caliber Pistol, FED’N AM. SCIENTISTS (Jan. 20, 1999 8:12 A.M.),
http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/land/m1911a1.htm.
155. See supra notes 46–47 and accompanying text.
156. See supra text accompanying notes 17–18.
157. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
158. See Greenberg, supra note 7.
159. Given the State Department’s apparent preparedness in removing the CAD files from
the Internet, it is similarly likely that the Department would have added UFA violations to its
letter if it reasonably believed them to be available.
160. 35 U.S.C. §§ 181–188 (2012). See generally Sabing H. Lee, Protecting the Private
Inventor Under the Peacetime Provisions of the Invention Secrecy Act, 12 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 345 (1997).
161. See Abreu, supra note 88.
162. See Lee, supra note 160, at 348.
163. See id.
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War but were reinvigorated with the rise of the Second World War.164 Originally, the
so-called secrecy orders would restrict these sensitive technologies for the duration
of the War, meaning that most secrecy orders from the First World War expired in
about one year.165 But, in preparation for the Second World War, Congress set the
duration for two years and then amended the two-year period to extend for the
duration of the War.166 Finally, in response to Department of Defense requests to
reestablish invention secrecy—and make certain temporary secrecy orders
permanent—Congress passed the ISA in 1951.167
The ISA allows the U.S. government to restrict the publication and award of
certain technologies in the patent application process if the government feels that the
technology is “detrimental to the national security . . . .”168 This restriction could
extend to an application for foreign patent rights as well.169 These patent secrecy
orders remain in effect for one year,170 requiring renewal each year,171 except during
periods of declared war or national emergency.172 In effect, if the government feels
that publication of some technology may threaten national security,173 it can order
that this technology remain secret. However, it is important to note that the scope of
the ISA is limited to patents, not just any publication.174

164. See id. at 349–50.
165. See id. at 349.
166. See id. at 349–50.
167. See id. at 351–52.
168. 35 U.S.C. § 181 para. 1 (2012).
169. Id. § 182 (describing involuntary forfeiture of patent should subject material be
published or filed in a foreign protection system).
170. Id. § 181 para. 4.
171. Id.
172. Id. It is not entirely clear when, if ever, during the timeframe of 1951–2014 that the
government could not argue that the country was not in such a period, as the United States has
been in a near-constant state of military involvement throughout the world. See, e.g., Timeline
of United States Military Operations, WIKIPEDIA http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Timeline_of
_United_States_military_operations (listing extensive U.S. military operations from 1775 to
present) (last modified Dec. 11, 2014).
173. In addition to physical security, the USPTO recently issued a request for comments
to limit patents that are “detrimental to the nation’s economic security.” Notice of Request for
Comments on the Feasibility of Placing Economically Significant Patents Under a Secrecy
Order and the Need To Review Criteria Used in Determining Secrecy Orders Related to
National Security, 77 Fed. Reg. 23,662 (Apr. 20, 2012).
174. Some correctly note that this grants the government a monopoly on the information,
but the scope still remains limited to a patent application. See Captain Gary L. Hausken, The
Value of a Secret: Compensation for Imposition of Secrecy Orders Under the Invention
Secrecy Act, 119 MIL. L. REV. 201, 202 (1988) (“The imposition of the secrecy order
effectively controls access to not only the application, but to the ideas and technology
contained within it. When combined with other forms of information control, the secrecy order
provides the government with a monopoly to exploit the invention contained within the
application.” (footnotes omitted)).
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2. De Facto Obsolescence of the ISA
It is this limited scope—patent rights—that ultimately voids any relevance to the
Defense Distributed situation or any similar publication scenarios. Defense Distributed
did not intend to secure the temporal monopoly provided by patent rights; it intended
to design and publish the CAD files for anyone to access.175 Securing patent protection
for Defense Distributed’s designs would be entirely contrary to the philosophy of
crypto-anarchism, for which Wilson strongly advocated.176 While certain aspects of the
manufacturing and design process pioneered by Defense Distributed may have met the
weighty burdens of the patent process,177 the point becomes moot a year after the
disclosure of the designs to the public.178 While Defense Distributed has not expressly
stated that it will forgo patent protection, it is fair to assume—based on the group’s
stated philosophy—that it will not seek patent protection.
Additionally, even if an inventor of a plastic firearm were to apply for patent
protections, it is not certain that such a technology would be “detrimental to national
security . . . .”179 The Defense Distributed designs have already taken root across the
Internet, so the expected detriment to the country may be already done. Conversely,
perhaps this issue has already been decided by the government in an ISA proceeding,
but the public obviously would not know of such a proceeding.180
Thus, while some advocate for the application of the ISA to plastic firearms, the
ISA once again fails to provide much—if any—limitation to the creation and
distribution of 3D-printed firearms such as the Liberator. Assuming the inventor does
not wish to secure patent protections, there is no ISA procedure that would limit a
mass distribution of such a firearm design through the Internet. While ISA limitations
could potentially suppress some 3D-printed firearm designs, the Act would do—and
did—nothing in this instance, and it is unlikely to have any effect for similar design
publications in the future.
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF TREATING CAD FILES AND 3D-PRINTED GOODS
AS DISPARATE FROM TRADITIONAL GOODS
Beyond merely posing regulatory issues, many wonder how an influx of
3D-printed weapons might affect the public welfare.181 While some fervently support
Defense Distributed’s vision of enabling every American citizen to bear arms with a
3D-printed firearm,182 others see the company’s vision as dangerous or
“misguided.”183 Similarly misguided, however, are individuals that see 3D printers

175. See Farivar, supra note 35; see also supra text accompanying notes 51–53 (explaining
crypto-anarchist philosophy).
176. See supra Part II.A.
177. The design and process arguably meets the core patentability requirements: subject matter,
novelty, nonobviousness, utility, and description. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–103, 112 (2012).
178. See id. § 102(a)–(b).
179. 35 U.S.C. § 181 para. 1 (2012).
180. It is a secrecy order after all; informing the public of the patent would defeat the purpose.
181. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 138–39.
182. See Greenberg, supra note 58.
183. See id.
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as deserving of disparate treatment due to the technology’s potential use as gun
factories.184 Based on the potential for beneficial utility, the previous treatment of
analogous technologies, and the phenomenal costs of effective enforcement, disparate
treatment of 3D printers and 3D-printed goods like the Liberator is unwarranted.
A. Freedom of Information
The idea of dangerous free speech is not new, sometimes being referred to as
“crime-facilitating speech.”185 In one scholar’s definition, “crime-facilitating
speech” is
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

any communication that,
intentionally or not,
conveys information that
makes it easier or safer for some listeners or readers (a) to commit crimes,
torts, acts of war (or other acts by foreign nations that would be crimes if
done by individuals), or suicide, or (b) to get away with committing such
acts.186

In this sense, Defense Distributed’s CAD files could be seen as facilitating the harms
that might ensue in the hands of the users, whether the designer intended for the
outcome or not.
One individual “described the Wiki Weapon project as an executable version of
‘The Anarchist’s [sic] Cookbook’ where you simply get the molotov cocktail instead
of reading about how to make one . . . .”187 However, as any movie or television
viewer can attest, there is a sharp distinction between watching an action and
performing that same action;188 treating The Anarchist Cookbook as an actual
Molotov cocktail would be just as irrational as treating a CAD file of a M1911 pistol
as a real pistol. Thus, lines must be drawn between something that teaches or depicts
harm and the harmful act itself.

184. Taken to a logical conclusion, if the potential for misuse resulted in bans on products, then
motor vehicles, airplanes, medications, and all firearms should be banned posthaste.
185. See generally Eugene Volokh, Crime-Facilitating Speech, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1095 (2005).
186. Id. at 1103 (footnote omitted).
187. Kopstein, supra note 51 (emphasis in original).
188. For example, it is unlikely that most individuals would feel comfortable disarming a
bomb as depicted in The Hurt Locker (Voltage Pictures 2008) or walking a tightrope strung
between the two towers of World Trade Center as documented in Man on Wire (Discovery
Films 2008). See also Steven G. Gey, The Apologetics of Suppression: The Regulation of
Pornography as Act and Idea, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1564, 1594 (1988) (“It is permissible to
purchase and possess the ‘Anarchists’ [sic] Cookbook’; it is not permissible to follow the
instructions in that book by buying the ingredients of a Molotov cocktail and mixing up a few
incendiaries on the kitchen table. The first amendment permits many things to be experienced
second-hand through print or videotape that cannot be done in person. It is not constitutionally
significant that the vicarious experience may produce in the viewer the same emotions or
responses as the act itself.” (footnote omitted)).
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Similarly, it could hardly be argued that most academic or illustrative materials
should be banned because of the subject being taught. For example, a user-submitted
YouTube video explaining how to hack a wireless device189 should—and most likely
would—be treated as illustrative material instead of inciting illegal activity. If the
opposite were true, it would effectively make the majority of topics at security
conferences like Def Con or Black Hat—such as 3D printing keys for high-security
locks, hacking pacemakers, or electronically disabling a vehicle’s brakes—illegal.190
In the given CAD file scenario, why should a CAD file depicting a firearm be treated
any differently than these comparable materials or instructions?
Perhaps the distinction that some would make derives from an instinctual reaction
that the CAD files allow criminals to be but a step away from an arsenal. Thus, the
files effectively enable a tangible good with little-to-no barriers to creation.191
However, such a tangible-intangible dichotomy has no place in a predictable and
reasonable legal field, as it would be entirely subjective in nature.192 Further, even if
a CAD file could be used to create a functional weapon, what if the inventor meant
the design to be a political statement—as Defense Distributed arguably meant to do
in this instance?193 Such issues would make any bright-line determinations of a
harmful design difficult or impossible, and such uncertainty should be avoided
whenever possible—and certainly when the result of overregulation would be to
harm an emerging technology with immensely beneficial uses.194
B. Taking Cues from the ITAR “Crypto Cases”
In addition to recognizing the potential disparate treatment of CAD files in
comparison to an article of crime-facilitating speech such as The Anarchist
Cookbook, it is also imperative to recognize past treatment of ITAR-restricted
information. Two lines of cases, Bernstein and Junger, specifically examined the use
of encryption software, which was an ITAR-restricted USML item.

189. See, e.g., Bryan Smith, Hacking WPA/WPA2 in Backtrack 5 R3 [HD + Narration],
YOUTUBE (June 12, 2013), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zAh0yQdLXDc.
190. See, e.g., Adrianne Jeffries, The Top 10 New Reasons To Be Afraid of Hackers, VERGE
(July 31, 2013, 9:40 AM), http://www.theverge.com/2013/7/31/4568992/top-10-new-reasons
-to-be-afraid-of-hackers-def-con-black-hat/in/4339859.
191. See Greenberg, supra note 7 (“‘A terrorist, someone who’s mentally ill, a spousal abuser,
[or] a felon can essentially open a gun factory in their garage,’ Schumer said in a press conference.”).
192. For example, what limits should one arbitrarily select as being too difficult or taking
too long to put a criminal more than a step away from a tangible arsenal?
193. See Bump, supra note 56. Even the design’s muse seems politically motivated. See
supra text accompanying notes 67–70 (describing the Liberator as the spiritual heir of a
firearm for freedom fighters).
194. See, e.g., Ashley Dara, 3D Printing Umbilical Cord Clamps in Haiti, MAKE (Oct. 18,
2013, 12:45 PM), http://makezine.com/2013/10/18/3d-printing-umbilical-cord-clamps-in-haiti/.
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1. Bernstein Line
In the Bernstein line of cases, Daniel Bernstein, “a PhD candidate in mathematics at
[the] University of California at Berkeley working in the field of cryptography,”195 sued
the U.S. government for the right “to publish and communicate his ideas on
cryptography.”196 Bernstein alleged that “he [was] not free to teach [his] Snuffle
[encryption] algorithm, to disclose it at academic conferences, or to publish it in journals
or online discussion groups without a[n ITAR] license.”197 Initially, Bernstein’s research
paper was among the items classified by the government under the USML, but the
government subsequently reclassified the paper after Bernstein filed the lawsuit.198 Judge
Patel of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California mooted “the claims
pertaining to the paper,”199 despite being “disquiet[ed]”200 by the government’s reversal
of its position towards the academic paper only after Bernstein filed the lawsuit, but still
rejected the government’s motion to dismiss (“Bernstein I”).201 Judge Patel held that
functional language deserves free speech protections,202 that source code is protectable
speech,203 and that Bernstein’s First Amendment claims were colorable.204 In a
subsequent decision (“Bernstein II”), Judge Patel held that the “ITAR licensing system
as applied to Category XIII(B) [which pertains to cryptography] acts as an
unconstitutional prior restraint in violation of the First Amendment”205 and that “the
technical data provision—only insofar as it relates to items in Category XIII(b)—is
unenforceable”;206 he also noted, however, that neither ITAR as a whole nor several
ITAR definitions are impermissibly vague or overbroad.207
In an interesting turn of events, less than a month prior to Bernstein II, President
Clinton issued Executive Order 13026,208 which “transferred jurisdiction over the
export of nonmilitary encryption products to the Department of Commerce . . . ,”209
and the Commerce Department then “issued an interim rule regulating the export of
certain encryption products.”210 Following the shift in the enforcing agency, Judge

195. Bernstein v. U.S. Dep’t of State (Bernstein I), 922 F. Supp. 1426, 1428 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
196. Id. at 1430.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 1434.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 1439.
202. Id. at 1435.
203. Id. at 1436.
204. Id. at 1437–39.
205. Bernstein v. U.S. Dep’t of State (Bernstein II), 945 F. Supp. 1279, 1290 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
206. Id. at 1292.
207. Id. at 1292–95.
208. Exec. Order No. 13,026, 3 C.F.R. § 58,767 (1996).
209. Bernstein v. U.S. Dep’t of State (Bernstein III), 974 F. Supp. 1288, 1291 (N.D. Cal.
1997), aff’d sub nom. Bernstein v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 176 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 1999), reh’g
granted, opinion withdrawn, 192 F.3d 1308 (9th Cir. 1999).
210. Id. at 1291–92; see also Encryption Items Transferred from the U.S. Munitions List
to the Commerce Control List, 61 Fed. Reg. 68,572 (Dec. 30, 1996) (codified at 15 C.F.R. pts.
730, 732, 734, 736, 738, 740, 742, 744, 748, 750, 768, 772 & 774) (issuing interim rule
regulating export of certain encryption products).
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Patel, in yet another decision (“Bernstein III”), determined that the regulations under
the Department of Commerce still violated the First Amendment due to prior
restraint211—which seemed obvious in light of the near identicalness of the
regulations212—that Bernstein and others should not face prosecution for teaching,
writing, using, discussing, or publishing of Bernstein’s encryption software;213 and
that Bernstein III would supersede, but not vacate, Bernstein II.214 Judge Patel also
explicitly stated, “While the government cannot avoid the constitutional deficiencies
of its regulations by rotating oversight of them from department to department, the
court does not believe that such was the intent here.”215 In essence, Bernstein
emerged overwhelmingly victorious at the district court level.
The government appealed to the Ninth Circuit, which, in a panel decision
(“Bernstein IV”), affirmed Judge Patel’s decisions below.216 Judge Fletcher found
that Bernstein, now a professor at the University of Illinois at Chicago,217 had First
Amendment protection for his encryption software as expressive speech218 and could
“properly bring a facial challenge against the [ITAR] regulations.”219 Ultimately
finding the regulations to be “an impermissible prior restraint on speech”;220 Judge
Fletcher also noted that these, or similar, regulations could pose Fourth Amendment
issues.221 Thus, Bernstein once again prevailed over the government’s ITAR
regulations. Following the panel decision, however, the government requested that
the panel opinion be withdrawn and the case be reheard en banc, to which the Ninth
Circuit agreed.222
Finally, before the case could be reheard en banc, the government made changes
to the regulations, prompting the Ninth Circuit to remand the case back to the District
Court instead of hearing it en banc.223 Despite the changes, several advocacy groups
still questioned the scope and intent of the revised regulations.224 The government,
however, chose to back away from regulating cryptographers under the regulations,
effectively mooting potential harm to Bernstein and the entire line of cases.225 As

211. Bernstein III, 974 F. Supp. at 1310.
212. Id. at 1304 (“Plaintiff contends that the new encryption regulations suffer from
identical deficiencies. Defendants do not argue that the effect of the new regulations is notably
different from that of the ITAR.”).
213. Id. at 1310.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Bernstein v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice (Bernstein IV), 176 F.3d 1132, 1135, 1147, reh’g
granted, opinion withdrawn, 192 F.3d 1308 (9th Cir. 1999).
217. Id. at 1135.
218. Id. at 1141.
219. Id. at 1143.
220. Id. at 1147.
221. Id. at 1146.
222. Bernstein v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice (Bernstein V), 192 F.3d 1308 (9th Cir. 1999).
223. See Press Release, Elec. Frontier Found., Professor Pushes for Revised Encryption
Regulations (Jan. 7, 2002), available at https://www.eff.org/press/archives/200201.
224. See Press Release, Elec. Frontier Found., Civil Liberties Grps. Say New Encryption
Exp. Regulations Still Have Serious Constitutional Deficiencies (Jan. 13, 2000), available at
https://w2.eff.org/Privacy/Crypto/20000113_eff_pr.php.
225. See Press Release, Daniel J. Bernstein, Gov’t Backs Away from Crypto Regulations
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predicted, Judge Patel dismissed Bernstein’s case; thus, ending “[t]he
longest-running court case against the government’s encryption regulations . . . .”226
In effect, the Bernstein line of cases proved to be a net gain for cryptographers
and Bernstein, forcing the government to revise and back down from what the courts
deemed a clear violation of the First Amendment. Additionally, at least in Bernstein’s
case, the court saw cryptography, software, and source code as protectable expressive
speech. But Bernstein was not the sole example of courts finding encryption and
software to be protected speech.
2. Junger Line
In the Junger line of cases, Peter Junger, a professor at Case Western Law School,
wrote encryption code for publication on his website and in his book.227 Junger
applied for a determination from the government concerning whether his software
and book would be restricted by export regulations.228 The government responded
that the regulations covered the majority of Junger’s works pertaining to encryption
software,229 and Junger challenged this decision in court (“Junger I”).230 Judge Gwin
found that the regulations need only survive intermediate scrutiny;231 “encryption
source code is not sufficiently communicative” under the Spence standard;232 the
regulations were “not narrowly directed at expressive conduct, and therefore not a
prior restraint”;233 and the regulations satisfied intermediate scrutiny.234 Thus, Judge
Gwin denied Junger’s summary judgment motion and granted the government’s
summary judgment motion.
On appeal, however, Chief Judge Martin, Jr.—writing for a unanimous Sixth
Circuit—reversed and remanded Junger I. Chief Judge Martin, Jr., in a brisk
five-page decision (“Junger II”), found that First Amendment protection “is not
reserved for purely expressive communication.”235 Noting that “[t]he [U.S.] Supreme
Court has expressed the versatile scope of the First Amendment by labeling as
‘unquestionably shielded’ the artwork of Jackson Pollack, the music of Arnold
Schoenberg, or the Jabberwocky verse of Lewis Carroll,”236 Chief Judge Martin, Jr.
explained that source code is indeed a protected, expressive means of speech secured
by the First Amendment.237

(Oct. 18, 2002), available at http://cr.yp.to/export/2002/10.18-bernstein.txt.
226. See Press Release, Daniel J. Bernstein, Crypto Case on Indefinite Hold (Oct. 15,
2003), available at http://cr.yp.to/export/2003/10.15-bernstein.txt.
227. Junger v. Daley (Junger I), 8 F. Supp. 2d 708, 713–14 (N.D. Ohio 1998), rev’d, 209
F.3d 481 (6th Cir. 2000).
228. Id. at 714.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 711.
231. Id. at 715.
232. Id. at 717–18.
233. Id. at 719.
234. Id. at 723.
235. Junger v. Daley (Junger II), 209 F.3d 481, 484 (6th Cir. 2000).
236. Id.
237. Id. at 485.
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The court did, however, “recognize that national security interests can outweigh the
interests of protected speech and require the regulation of speech”;238 but the
government bears this burden and did not meet its burden in this case.239 Similar to the
Ninth Circuit in Bernstein IV, the Sixth Circuit remanded the case back to the district
court to reexamine the effect of the government’s revisions to the regulations before the
case could progress further.240 Unfortunately, Junger dismissed the case on remand,241
so we are again left wondering at the final result of the case, although the outcome would
likely have followed a similar theme as occurred in Bernstein on remand.
3. Comparison to Defense Distributed and CAD Files
Given that cryptography research and code was treated as an article of free speech
by two circuits, while having clearly functional aspects and being restricted under
the veil of national security, why should a CAD file be any different? It is curious
that a CAD file, which is nothing more than the output of a computer program,242
would be treated as having less First Amendment protections than the protections
granted in either Bernstein or Junger.
Defense Distributed clearly had an expressive message in mind—that is, for the
furtherance of Second Amendment rights among U.S. citizens243—which would
likely be afforded more protection than encryption software.244 Further, 3D
artwork,245 animation,246 and printing247 have been used in a wide range of projects—
often with far wider audiences than an encryption program248—thus, it seems
peculiar that encryption software is afforded protection from ITAR, while digital
visual art (such as a CAD file) is not similarly protected. Because of these distinctions

238. Id.
239. See id.
240. Id. Not all commentators agree with the Sixth Circuit’s broad categorization of source
code as protected speech. See generally Recent Case, Junger v. Daley, 209 F.3d 481 (6th Cir.
2000), 114 HARV. L. REV. 1813 (2001).
241. Junger v. Daley, 1:96-cv-01723-JG (N.D. Ohio Nov. 16, 2000) (dismissing case
with prejudice).
242. See, e.g., Blake Courter, A Brief Introduction to CAD File Formats, GRABCAD (Apr.
22, 2013), http://blog.grabcad.com/2013/04/a-brief-introduction-to-cad-file-formats/.
243. See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
244. If one assumes that source code is roughly as expressive to programmers as CAD files
are to designers, then the additional political message would afford the CAD file greater
weight as expressive speech.
245. See, e.g., Aquil Akhter, 45 Amazing Examples of Code Generated and 3D CG
Artworks, SMASHING MAG. (Aug. 21, 2009), http://www.smashingmagazine.com/2009/08
/21/45-amazing-examples-of-code-generated-and-3d-cg-artworks/.
246. See, e.g., List of Computer-Animated Films, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org
/wiki/List_of_computer-animated_films (last modified Dec. 6, 2014).
247. See, e.g., Nick Clark, Cutting-Edge Technology: 3D Printed Artworks Exhibited, and
Not a Paper Jam in Sight, INDEPENDENT.CO.UK (Nov. 7, 2013), http://www.independent.co.uk
/arts-entertainment/art/news/cuttingedge-technology-3d-printed-artworks-exhibited-and-not-a
-paper-jam-in-sight-8927904.html.
248. See, e.g., List of Highest-Grossing Animated Films, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org
/wiki/List_of_highest-grossing_animated_films (last modified Dec. 8, 2014).
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and the seemingly greater expressivity implied by the Liberator, Defense
Distributed’s should have received as much, if not more, First Amendment protection
than encryption software.
C. Cost Burdens of Enforcement
Lastly, outside of the above issues regarding disparate treatment, concerns about
the economics and possibility of enforcement must be addressed. Put another way, it
would be preferable if the cost of regulating 3D-printed firearms would not amount
to millions or billions of dollars and if the regulations would be effective.249 A 2010
estimate placed the cost of firearm violence at more than $174 billion, which equals
a “sum of $564 per American.”250 While this is certainly an alarming figure, it speaks
of the systemic cost of firearm violence, including the initial medical and police costs,
as well as the continuing work, mental health, and quality of life expenses.251 It is
important to note, however, that these particular costs in no way estimate the cost of
3D-printed firearm violence specifically, as said violence is effectively unheard of at
this point. Setting aside the potential cost of violence, however, this Comment instead
will consider the cost of enforcing regulation on 3D-printed firearms.
Starting from the presumption that the government cannot, or would not, pass a
blanket prohibition of 3D printers, preventing individuals from designing firearms in
CAD programs will prove entirely ineffective. While some software manufacturers
have implemented technological safeguards against illegal activity, such as currency
counterfeiting,252 it is patently absurd that every CAD software manufacturer would
implement firearm detection measures in their code and that such code would reliably
and consistently detect firearms and firearm components.253 Besides this absurdity,
designing a 3D model of a firearm can have a variety of legitimate uses—for
example, weapon models in video games.254 Thus, preventing CAD files of firearms
at the point of origin would be entirely ineffective for regulating 3D-printed firearms.

249. Cf. Richard Branson, War on Drugs a Trillion-Dollar Failure, CNN.COM (Dec. 7, 2012,
6:05 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/12/06/opinion/branson-end-war-on-drugs/; Aaron Houston,
America’s Longest War Has Shown Once Again Prohibition Doesn’t Work, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP. (July 6, 2012, 5:02 PM), http://www.usnews.com/debate-club/is-it-time-to-scale-back-the
-war-on-drugs/americas-longest-war-has-once-again-shown-that-prohibition-doesnt-work
(discussing the high cost and ineffectiveness of the illegal drug regulations).
250. Abram Brown, How Guns and Violence Cost Every American $564 in 2010,
FORBES.COM (Jan. 14, 2013, 9:00 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/abrambrown/2013
/01/14/how-guns-and-violence-cost-every-american-564-in-2010/. Some view calculations
such as these to be “amoral.” See, e.g., Harry Binswanger, With Gun Control, Cost Benefit
Analysis Is Amoral, FORBES.COM (Jan. 1, 2013, 11:15 AM), http://www.forbes.com
/sites/harrybinswanger/2013/01/01/with-gun-control-cost-benefit-analysis-is-amoral/.
251. See Brown, supra note 250.
252. See, e.g., Photoshop Help: Photoshop and CDS, ADOBE, http://www.adobe.com
/special/products/photoshop/cds.html.
253. Cf. Matthew Taylor, How To Counterfeit Money, MATTHEW TAYLOR
http://www.matthewtaylor.co.nz/2012/02/27/how-to-counterfeit-money/
(suggesting
to
simply use a program other than new versions of Adobe Photoshop to edit banknotes).
254. David Houghton, Fantastic Video Game Weapons Vs Their Real-Life Equivalents,
GAMESRADAR (Feb. 15, 2010), http://www.gamesradar.com/fantastic-video-game-weapons
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Similarly, attempting to prevent individuals from uploading firearm CAD files to
the Internet will prove equally futile. While some 3D model repositories proactively
filter out such designs,255 not all file-sharing websites will be so cooperative or
proactive.256 This leaves uploaders with plenty of options to share their designs. Next,
assuming the uploader uses some sort of anonymization technique—for example,
Tor or a Virtual Private Network257—the complexity and cost of identifying the
uploader increases dramatically.258 Putting these two factors together, any uploader
with even minimal technical ability259 can upload a CAD file with near anonymity
from the comfort of his or her home or any open Wi-Fi network, making any realistic
attempts of regulation futile.
Finally, if the firearm CAD files do reach the Internet, enforcement must now
shift to either (1) regulating the entire Internet, (2) regulating individual 3D printers,
or (3) regulating inputs for 3D printers—all options that will prove overbroad, overly
expensive, or both. With regard to option (1), the government might be attempting
to capture and store everything it can from the Internet—legally or not260—but it is
unlikely that it will be able to track and unmask every uploader in the near future.261
This leaves us with options (2) and (3).
Option (2)—regulating each individual 3D printer—would prove ineffective and
excessively expensive. Imagine a regulation specifying that any firearm or
component of a firearm may not be printed by a 3D printer without individual
government authorization. This regulation would prove administratively unworkable
by even a moderate volume of requests to repair a broken firearm component (e.g.,
a trigger or trigger guard) by 3D printing the component; to design and print custom
grip panels; or to simply print a nonfunctional replica of a firearm for display
purposes. Aside from the administrative costs of such a licensing scheme, preventing
an unauthorized user from designing and printing these components would prove as
ineffective as preventing another person from whittling the same component from a
block of wood or milling it from a block of metal. Even the proposal from
Representative Israel262 gives no real method of preventing such designs from being
printed.263 Simply put, the government has no viable way of regulating 3D printers

-vs-their-real-life-equivalents.
255. E.g., Andy Greenberg, 3D-Printing Firm Makerbot Cracks Down on Printable Gun
Designs, FORBES.COM (Dec. 19, 2012, 4:30 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/andygreenberg
/2012/12/19/3d-printing-startup-makerbot-cracks-down-on-printable-gun-designs/.
256. See Mead, supra note 80.
257. See, e.g., Douglas Crawford, Tor vs. VPN, BESTVPN (May 16, 2013),
https://www.bestvpn.com/blog/5888/tor-vs-vpn/.
258. See, e.g., Robertson, supra note 121 (noting that even the NSA has difficulties
identifying users anonymized with Tor).
259. This is not hard to imagine given the uploader’s ability to create or upload a CAD file
of a functional firearm or at least to follow a guide to do so. See Running the Tor Client on
Microsoft Windows, TOR PROJECT, https://www.torproject.org/docs/tor-doc-windows.html.en.
260. See, e.g., T.C. Sottek, The Edge of the Abyss: Exposing the NSA’s All-Seeing Machine,
VERGE (Nov. 12, 2013, 12:00 PM), http://www.theverge.com/2013/11/12/5082666/the-edge
-of-the-abyss-exposing-the-nsas-all-seeing-machine.
261. See, e.g., Robertson, supra note 121.
262. See supra text accompanying note 140.
263. Cory Doctorow, Congressman Calls for Ban on 3D Printed Guns, BOING BOING (Dec.

928

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 90:901

to prevent the printing of firearms, and any such attempts to regulate each 3D printer
would cause far more administrative headaches than it could potentially solve.
Finally, option (3)—regulating the inputs of 3D printers—stands a greater chance
of working but will still fail due to its overbroad nature. For example, if each
3D-printed firearm required a specific type of plastic to make the firearm, then the
government might attempt to regulate this specific input to indirectly limit
3D-printed firearms. However, current 3D-printed firearm designs are capable of
being printed with a commercial-grade 3D printer and standard ABS plastic.264 Thus,
while Defense Distributed created the original Liberator with an industrial-grade
printer, commonly available printers and materials are clearly capable of reproducing
a similar product, and attempting to regulate such inputs would effectively regulate
every design using these common materials or would simply result in the creation of
functional variants using unregulated materials. Ultimately, regulating the inputs of
3D printers would prove as ineffective as options (1) and (2).
D. Summary of Implications and Feasibility
When looking at the past, present, and future implications of regulating 3D-printed
firearms, one trend seems to prevail: problems. Treating CAD files disparate from a
software encryption program, a how-to manual, or a book seems inconsistent with
previous decisions. CAD files arguably represent an expressive speech and will be
afforded First Amendment protection, barring outright censorship.
Even if regulations were put in place, actual enforcement of those regulations would
be laughable. Regulating uploaders or 3D printers is unlikely to succeed, and costs
associated with attempting such regulations would be astronomical. Thus, attempting to
regulate 3D-printed firearms or their respective CAD files will likely face numerous
hurdles, and overall regulation would prove too onerous for tangible efficacy.
V. A PROPOSAL FOR A NEW STANDARD OF REGULATING 3D-PRINTED GOODS
Given the relative inadequacy of existing regulations, the potential for stiflingly
overbroad new regulations, and the multitude of public policy rationales against such
new regulations, it is necessary to devise a more reasoned standard for instances of
first-impression with emerging technologies like 3D printers. A large part of such a
reasoned standard must be examining the potential for legitimate use of the
technology and weighing such legitimate use against potential misuse. Taking
inspiration from both patent and copyright law doctrines, as well as U.S. Supreme
Court wisdom, this Comment proposes a “substantial legal uses” standard based off
the “substantial noninfringing uses” standard from the Court’s decision in Sony Corp.
of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.265

9, 2012, 11:37 AM), http://boingboing.net/2012/12/09/congressman-calls-for-ban-on-3.html.
264. See Greenberg, supra note 41.
265. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
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A. Sony Betamax and the “Substantial Noninfringing Uses” Standard
In Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.—also known as the
“Betamax case”266—the U.S. Supreme Court reviewed whether the primary usage of
Sony’s Betamax video tape recorder was for legal purposes or not.267 Specifically,
Universal City Studios and Walt Disney Productions (“Universal”) believed that the
primary usage of Sony’s new technology would be for copyright infringement
perpetrated by Betamax customers.268 Thus, Universal sued Sony and Sony’s
distributors (“Sony”) in 1976, alleging both direct and indirect infringement.269
The California District Court ruled for Sony three years later on the grounds of
fair use.270 Specifically, Judge Ferguson found “that home-use recording from free
television is not a copyright infringement and that, even if it were, the corporate
defendants are not liable and an injunction is not appropriate.”271 On appeal,
however, the Ninth Circuit reversed and found Sony liable for contributory
infringement.272 Judge Kilkenny, writing for the Ninth Circuit, reasoned, “We find
no Congressional intent to create a blanket home use exception to copyright
protection and that home videorecording [sic] does not constitute fair use. In
addition, the appellees are legally responsible for the infringing activity.”273 Sony
appealed this judgment.274
Writing for the U.S. Supreme Court, Justice Stevens reversed the Ninth Circuit.275
Summarizing the decisions below, Justice Stevens noted,
The Court of Appeals’ holding that respondents are entitled to enjoin the
distribution of VTR’s, to collect royalties on the sale of such equipment,
or to obtain other relief, if affirmed, would enlarge the scope of
respondents’ statutory monopolies to encompass control over an article
of commerce that is not the subject of copyright protection. Such an
expansion of the copyright privilege is beyond the limits of the grants
authorized by Congress.276
Justice Stevens went on to note a number of useful features of the Betamax video
recorder, including separate tuners for viewing and recording; reusable tapes; timers
for recording when the users were away; and pause and fast-forward functions

266. See, e.g., The Betamax Case, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., https://w2.eff.org/legal
/cases/betamax/.
267. Sony Betamax, 464 U.S. at 419–20.
268. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 480 F. Supp. 429, 459 (C.D. Cal.
1979), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981), rev’d, 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
269. See id. at 457–63.
270. See id. at 446–57.
271. Id. at 469.
272. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 659 F.2d 963, 974–76 (9th Cir.
1981), rev’d, 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
273. Id. at 977.
274. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc. (Sony Betamax), 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
275. Id. at 456.
276. Id. at 421.
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allowing the user to skip advertisements.277 The most desirable feature, according to
customers, was the “time-shifting” ability—that is, “the practice of recording a
program to view it once at a later time, and thereafter erasing it.”278 This same feature,
however, could potentially violate copyright law if the recording was a “copy” for
copyright purposes and not excused by fair use.279 In essence, Universal argued that
Sony facilitated copyright infringement by providing would-be infringers with the
tools to copy.280 To resolve this conflict, Justice Stevens looked to another realm of
intellectual property: patent law.281
The Patent Act of 1952282 expressly defines “both the concept of infringement and
the concept of contributory infringement . . . .”283 Stevens noted, “The prohibition
against contributory infringement is confined to the knowing sale of a component
especially made for use in connection with a particular patent. . . . [T]he Act expressly
provides that the sale of a ‘staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for
substantial noninfringing use’ is not contributory infringement.”284 Additionally,
Stevens noted that the Court has significantly restricted the scope of contributory
infringement suits under patent law to prevent a copyright holder from “extend[ing]
his monopoly beyond the limits of his specific grant [of patent rights].”285 As stated
by the Court previously, “[A] sale of an article which though adapted to an infringing
use is also adapted to other and lawful uses, is not enough to make the seller a
contributory infringer. Such a rule would block the wheels of commerce.”286
While recognizing the fundamental differences between the realms of patent and
copyright, Justice Stevens noted the need for the Court to balance the intellectual
property holder’s protection rights with the rights of those “engag[ing] in
substantially unrelated areas of commerce.”287 Thus, “the sale of copying equipment,
like the sale of other articles of commerce, does not constitute contributory
infringement if the product is widely used for legitimate, unobjectionable purposes.
Indeed, it need merely be capable of substantial noninfringing uses.”288
Looking to both authorized and unauthorized time-shifting behaviors by Betamax
customers, Justice Stevens found that Sony’s Betamax video recorder was capable
of the necessary substantial noninfringing uses.289 Summarizing the District Court’s
findings, to which the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed, Justice Stevens stated,

277. Id. at 422–23.
278. Id. at 423.
279. Id. at 463 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
280. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 480 F. Supp. 429, 461–62 (C.D. Cal.
1979), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981), rev’d, 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
281. See Sony Betamax, 464 U.S. at 439.
282. Patent Act of 1952, 35 U.S.C. §§ 1–376 (2012).
283. Sony Betamax, 464 U.S. at 440; see also 35 U.S.C. § 271 (codifying patent
infringement).
284. Sony Betamax, 464 U.S. at 440 (emphasis added) (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 271(c)).
285. Id. at 441.
286. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1, 48 (1912)).
287. Id. at 442.
288. Id. (emphasis added).
289. Id. at 456.
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Sony demonstrated a significant likelihood that substantial numbers
of copyright holders who license their works for broadcast on free
television would not object to having their broadcasts time-shifted by
private viewers. And second, respondents failed to demonstrate that
time-shifting would cause any likelihood of nonminimal harm to the
potential market for, or the value of, their copyrighted works. The
Betamax is, therefore, capable of substantial noninfringing uses.290
Thus, the Court held “Sony’s sale of such equipment to the general public does not
constitute contributory infringement of respondent’s copyrights.”291 It is from this
standard that this Comment derives inspiration for a standard to view emerging
technologies.
B. Workability and Use of the Proposed “Substantial Legal Uses” Standard
Taking into account the potential impact of 3D printing to both the patent292 and
copyright293 realms of intellectual property, Sony Betamax’s fusion of patent and
copyright law seems especially appropriate as a muse. As with the balancing that must
occur with contributory infringement, the specter of emerging technologies must be
weighed against the potential for overbroad and damaging regulation. In this case,
overbroad regulation on 3D printing would result in a significant and unnecessary
obstacle. This Comment provides a variation of the substantial noninfringing uses
standard of Sony Betamax to provide a solution: substantial legal uses.
Under this Comment’s “substantial legal uses” standard, instead of assuming the
absolute worst possible outcome of a new technology and implementing myopic
policies in a knee-jerk reaction, a court or legislature would examine the potential
legal uses of the good or medium. In essence, this proposal attempts to instill
common sense into an arena of hyperbole. Instead of assuming the conclusion—for
example, “Video Killed the Radio Star”294—the question would instead be “What
legal uses does video provide?”
Keeping continuity with previous decisions, Sony’s Betamax video recorder (or
VHS, Blu-Ray, etc.) would not be banned merely because the technologies provide
an individual with a tool to perpetrate a crime. In the same vein, 3D printers possess
clear potential for substantial legal uses despite some potential illegal uses. As has
already been seen and created, 3D printers have created a wide variety of tangible,
beneficial goods;295 3D printers are even being used to save lives in poverty and

290. Id. (emphasis added).
291. Id.
292. See generally Davis Doherty, Note, Downloading Infringement: Patent Law as a
Roadblock to the 3D Printing Revolution, 26 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 353 (2012); Wilbanks, supra
note 14.
293. See generally Haritha Dasari, Assessing Copyright Protection and Infringement
Issues Involved with 3D Printing and Scanning, 41 AIPLA Q.J. 279 (2013); Brian Rideout,
Printing the Impossible Triangle: The Copyright Implications of Three-Dimensional Printing,
5 J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 161 (2011).
294. See generally THE BUGGLES, Video Killed the Radio Star, on THE AGE OF PLASTIC
(Island Records 1979).
295. See supra notes 28–30 and accompanying text.
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grief-stricken areas.296 Just as some manuscript advocates likely condemned
Gutenberg for the potential misuse of his printing press, it should be blatantly obvious
to any scholar that the printed word remains one of the most important inventions for
human society. So too should the potential uses of 3D printers be acknowledged.
Similarly, the vast majority of inputs and outputs of a 3D printer are likely to be capable
of substantial legal uses. For example, a 3D printer could print a school project, a
building design, a cup holder, a button, or an unlimited number of other designs.
This unlimited potential also bares the heart of this issue—potentially supplying
an individual with a 3D-printed arsenal—but this assumption is flawed because it
plays to the exception instead of the rule. Ultimately, designs must be treated on a
case-by-case, factual basis. One person might print the exterior and projectiles to a
potential pipe bomb intending to wreak havoc, and another person might wish to
print an inert replica of a World War II grenade for display in his or her home with
war memorabilia. The former explosive clearly has little-to-no legal purpose, while
the latter has benign, or perhaps historical, intent. Thus, although a 3D printer could
be used to print a weapon, a murderer could just as easily kill with a spatula, a toilet
tank lid, or a chessboard297—the latter two also being undetectable to metal
detectors—and it is clearly overzealous to enact blanket restrictions.
Finally, looking specifically at 3D-printed firearms as a contestable output under
the proposed substantial legal uses standard, this Comment proposes that a design
that would otherwise be legal—but for being printed on a 3D printer—should be
treated as a legal firearm. Put another way, a Model 1911 pistol, printed in metal or
plastic, would be treated as equivalent to a machined Model 1911 pistol (assuming
all other federal and state requirements and restrictions, such as licensure and
detectability, are met).
Stepping back, there are substantial legal uses for a 3D-printed firearm—such as
recreation, hunting, personal defense, or merely collection—as long as the firearm
owner follows existing rules. Excluding specific classes of restricted weapons, such
as fully automatic firearms, most U.S. citizens may buy, own, sell, and use firearms
if they so choose. Indeed, the ATF has clearly stated that an individual may create
his or her own firearms, subject to certain design limitations (e.g., automatic
weapons).298 The method selected by a citizen for making that firearm—whether by
machining, casting, whittling, or printing—should make no difference in determining
the legality of the firearm’s creation or ownership.
However, this careful examination of emerging technologies is apparently too
cumbersome for some politicians faced with these new threats. On December 4,
2013, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, became the first city in the United States to outlaw
3D-printed guns299 despite the fact that “there hasn’t been a documented example yet

296. See supra note 194.
297. Admin, 12 Most Unusual Murder Weapons Used in Real Life, RAWJUSTICE.COM
(Sept. 13, 2010), http://rawjustice.com/2010/09/13/12-most-unusual-murder-weapons-used
-in-real-life/.
298. See Press Release, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, 3-D
Printing Tech. of Firearms (Nov. 13, 2013), available at https://www.atf.gov/sites/default
/files/assets/pdf-files/111313-hq-3-d-printing-technology-of-firearms.pdf.
299. PHILA. CODE, § 10-2001 to -2003 (2013) (codifying Bill No. 130584 to “prohibit[] the use
of a three-dimensional printer in order to manufacture a firearm”); Alexis Kleinman, Philadelphia
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of any hobbyists or weapons enthusiasts in Philadelphia firing or even creating 3Dprinted guns in city limits. . . .”300 When asked for the basis of the ban, Steve Cobb—
the director of legislation for the ban’s sponsor, Kenyatta Johnson—stated, “It’s all
pre-emptive. . . . It’s just based upon internet [sic] stuff out there.”301 Philadelphia is
not alone in its knee-jerk reaction approach to legislation, however, as “lawmakers
in California, New York City and Washington, DC have all suggested that officials
adopt legislation that would limit what 3D printers could produce, particularly after
Defense Distributed’s model made waves with the federal government.”302 While it
may be true that “[w]e must be proactive in seeking solutions to this new threat rather
than wait for the inevitable tragedies this will make possible,”303 it is equally true
that lawmaking solely “based upon internet [sic] stuff”304 thoughtlessly endangers
emerging technologies. While proactive legislation is a welcome variation on current
congressional trends, perhaps the Philadelphia City Council should have performed
a good-faith assessment of the technology and consulted experts to reach an informed
decision. Even then, and as discussed above, a federal license305 should not be
required to create 3D-printed firearms that are the functional equivalents of
traditional firearms.
Ultimately, it is better to know of these technologies in public than to demonize
them so that they are developed in secret. Should the government decide to make the
creation of 3D-printed firearms illegal, the only realistic outcomes are
(1) development of potential weapons outside of government knowledge or
regulation; (2) anonymization and fracturing of existing designs; and (3) hyperbolic
elevation of plastic firearms as uncontrollable weapons, actually driving adoption by
way of the Streisand Effect.306 Thus, not only would a more reasoned and thoughtful
approach to 3D-printed firearm regulation be beneficial from the aspect of
engineering, but it would potentially serve to prevent violence in the long run.
CONCLUSION
While the control of various aspects of citizens’ lives through the regulation of
harmful circumstances and substances is understandable—if not noble—from a

Is the First U.S. City To Ban 3D-Printed Guns, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 26, 2013, 2:49 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/11/26/3d-gun-philadelphia_n_4344733.html.
300. First Ban in the Country: 3D-Printed Guns Now Illegal in Philadelphia, RT.COM
(Nov. 27, 2013, 8:30 AM), http://rt.com/usa/philly-gun-ban-johnson-280/.
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. PHILA. CODE, § 10-2002 (2013) (“No person shall use a three-dimensional printer to
create any firearm, or any piece or part thereof, unless such person possesses a license to
manufacture firearms under Federal law, 18 U.S.C. § 923(a).” (emphasis added)).
306. The Streisand Effect is a phenomenon whereby an act of censorship of a subject
unintentionally results in increased publication of the subject. Specifically, Barbra Streisand’s
attempted suppression of photographs of her Malibu, California, home led to extensive public
attention, parody, and distribution of the photographs. See Wendy Seltzer, Free Speech
Unmoored in Copyright’s Safe Harbor: Chilling Effects of the DMCA on the First Amendment,
24 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 171, 215 & n.229 (2010).
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public policy perspective, it must also be recognized that such control can be naïve
and archaic when applied to certain areas of technological advance. Moats and
drawbridges no longer protect homes, reading and writing are no longer restricted to
the wealthy, and information exchange is global and nearly instantaneous. Even the
U.S. military and intelligence agencies fail to guard their own secrets.307
Technological decentralization makes the traditional control of information308—
good or bad—a child’s fantasy. Understanding that disruptive technological
advances need not necessarily doom civilization will be vital for the organic growth
of such advances and society as a whole.
3D printers represent just such a disruptive advance. Based on the First and
Second Amendment implications of potential litigation, the courts may see some
very strange bedfellows—for example, the Electronic Frontier Foundation, the
American Civil Liberties Union, and the National Rifle Association—arguing for
both the freedom of information and firearm rights. But it is because of these
exceptional implications that such groups, which would otherwise be diametrically
opposed, can collaborate.
In sum, while this Comment uses Defense Distributed and 3D-printed firearms as
a useful anecdote, the proposed “substantial legal uses” standard is meant to have far
broader effects. Whether the case is a 3D-printed good, a video recorder, or a digital
currency,309 the potential for overbroad and unnecessary regulation poses a serious,
deleterious risk to emerging technologies. Thus, this Comment’s proposal attempts
to bring some much-needed reason to what might otherwise result in an impetuous
reaction of legislation.

307. See, e.g., Toor, supra note 120.
308. See supra text accompanying note 118.
309. See, e.g., Danton Bryans, Bitcoin and Money Laundering: Mining for an Effective
Solution, 89 IND. L.J. 441 (2014) (describing Bitcoin, a disruptive digital currency, and
proposing solutions to potential government regulation of digital currencies).

